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I i T 11 ( D U G T  1 0 i .
Proverbs, it yi been ,vild, are thri "-it of
kno, le Ie, "-- "thie gather 1 8 of a 7es. " They are the
unuatl of practIcal wi siom and understanding drawn froll
the school of experience. Their precepts are the re-
sult of real Ilfo; and iot the erroneous oucluloo:IC
of speculative inquirers. It has been slrid that thOre
is rio proverb :hicis not true, because "they are the
result of experleice itself, which is the mother of all
seien ces. " Lord B acon has truly observed tht"the
;enfus, wit, and spirtt of a nati on are discovered1 by
t)el r proverbs:"
A maxim 18 in law what a proverb is in the ordin-
ary affairs of life. They vwere termed by the Roman
II II
C>v7:iians le 1 1 leges,-- law of laws. Lord Coke de-
fiies a 1,,axim of law,. to be a "conclii1ion of r'>o";
arid considered thews of such ImDortance that !n onumer-
atlig the several sources, or, a he calls t-iem "foru-
tains" of the lan, from wi c i o e draws hIs proofs an-d
argumenta, he heads the list with the V:Iazlms of thre
Such bein the iriportance of' maxims, it follows
that they occupy a pro-rinent -lace la, all leoytl sys-
terns, ancient ad modern. In the absence of such guid(
as thece, the body of every legal oystoan would be a
m.:y and perplexing labyrInth. I! th the a confusing
macs of infinite details are thromT into dofini te arid
compact groups. Nfl thout them the lawyer would often
be in despair at the ab"undance of his material. ,W1th
then he has his clue from w-hich to work.
A lawyer can at the present day, o.ilng to the
rapid multiplicity of judicial reports, find a case In
point on both sides of almost every stated question;
and so it is that resort must be had to that which un-
derlies all declolons--the conclusions of sound reason.
Following these ne is placed above the confusion of
conflicting rulings. For the able jurist is not he
who can ground his oDinions on the greatest number of
cases in point, but rather upon the deduction of' re'ison.
It is .iith one of these Maxims that we have to
deal in tie follo',ving pa-es, viz; "Hespondeat Superlor,"
3or i the phraoe irnolI es "let the princlTe inrv,,er, "
Involving, ae it docn, "t kuio-,,lerl e of /,,ge,'cy, and >.a3-
tor anid Servunt, its practical importance in every ,Iy
affalr8 of life munlfeots it-elf at once.
o R I T I 0 F T id E 1) 0 -; T h I iKi E
From the early la:tyo of' our jurisprudence It tas
been stated as an universal rule tdst a print~pal or
mr.ster 1 clvitJy renoonoble for alI wrongs co-nl tted
by his servants vrhile actIng about his busines ; but
it Is difficult to quote a distinct reason in ou port
of' It.
,:vany of our principles of law are of such urilver-
oal application, and result so manifestly and directly
from motives of public policy on ;hlch our social rela-
tions depend, tiat they see:,, at first thiought, to have
always existed as an inherent part of our legal system.
The fact that these M-7,axims,-principles of law,-are so
universally applied, and are the result of such gralual,
continous growth, Takes it the more difficult to deter-
mine just at ',.t particular time and under what cir-
curmotafncos they originated.
Me rule of law under consideration is analogous
to that universal rule vwicIch the law limoses upon every
member of society, which compels a man to so control
his buslneos as not to injure others. Tith such an
oblIIir tton the law justly chareB a I vith the ame
roponsibItity for vcts done by the hrnlds of another,
under his direction, as for acts done by his ovan hands.
This rule of liw takes ito form in tre maxim -1 qui
facit per allum, facit per se, what he does tirough an-
other, he does through himself. The technical distinc-
tion between this xi anJ tho one under consIderiti on,-
Respoarleat Superior, -- 1s that the former apollea more
particularly to actioulo ex dellcto, while the latter is
used -vith reference to actions ex contractu.
The principle underlyin the viaxrm Trohably first
ortginated among the Romnaans; ,j i tra-ce of the max-
im itself -Ippears to have been found in the works of
the Roman Jurists. Although a large portion of our
law Is borrow-ed from the Civilians, still, as their
social and political relatons were radically different
fr-- ours tli many reopect-), necesslty demanded a very
different cot of rules ;hlch were peculiarly applicable
to thimt tine. 'So we find that the Romians Itreatment
of this subject was affected by several considerations
wiiic we do not apply to ourselves. The use of the
terr Servant, in the cnse in vTiich ve now hold it, vias
tnl aTplle only to the slive. Secoidly, their Idea
of Freermen had associated with it a degree of haughty
Independence, whicoh was enti rely iconsistent with
such a subordination as the doctrine of Respondent
Superior aa8urae.. They also held that this notion of
independenrce did not apply to the flllus farnillas, but
that for the acts of the filius far !ltap the pater f>-
miliao wU under certain circumsttances liable. Jus-
tln lun (1) lays down the rule on this subject as follows:
"Y/rere a delict is committed by a slave, a noxal action
lies against the master, who on belng condemned, has
i!s option of paying the daag es awarded, or surren-
dering the slave in satisfaction of the injury. " In
the early days of Rome thaese actions were a,),plted to
wronigs co'niitted by children in power no le.s than by
slaveuJ; but, "the feeling of' modern times has rightly re-
belled "._-lst such inhimanity, and the noxal surrender
of children tnder power has quite g-one out of' use."
The Roman la.7 on the subject of vicarious liabil-
ity may be briefly stated in the three followvini, propo-
1 ) .Inst. IV, Ti t. , B.
sitions: (a) ihe master vwas liable for till -cts of
his slave. Un'or the old law, As was staited, the man-
tor could relieve ilmoelff from this liability by surren-
dering the clave under the priniople Noxa caput sequltur,-
the crime follown the author or head. This rule was,
ho wever, subsequently chanred in. the master's favor, as
It was illeed, by putting the Master In the slaveb
place so far as to make him responsible for the slave's
delicts. (b) Th-e pater farw. lias was, 'Lnder the old lawr,
liable to an action for the misconduct of the fillus
fam i1l(s. Here the basis of the action was the theory
of the subjection of the family to the pater familias.
They declared that the father could not take the bee-
fits of h1s supremacy without its burdens; in other
words, If he was to receive the profits, it was just
that he should be charged xwith the loss. (0) vlhere a
person undertook by contract to perform a certain plece
of work, and such work required the co-operation of em-
ployers, he was liable for any ne 7ll1e1Sce of' the employ-
ers which occured in dischargini? their duties.
Tre first mention of the Ma xim in the Ehglish law
is found in Coke's Institutes (1) where Sir l'ward Coke,
observing that "it is good to know ro7 t2he law co-mrTonly
called Hespondeat -uperior holdetih In our courts," eaTo
in conclusion, of an old case, "if BallvIns hns not the
ability to respond, then the master responds." _e
rule sugi;eot8 that the rmster will, in all cases, be
liable for wroan.s comrl ttel by Tis servant, vhen acting
about the master's business, trough inattention or want
of skill. All of the ut!horities, from the earlieot
cases doyn, support this. The rule is so plain that am
exarmple by way of' elucidation, would not make it clearer.
Hor is there nmy difficultyin applying it so as to
charg¢e the master for injuries inflicted by the servant
in executing different orders. As for exariile where
A employs B to cut down trees on his land and omits to
instruct 13 so that he might distinguish the boundaries
of his -(A's) -- land. A will be liable for tie trees
of an a ijo1nii owLer wnich 13 improper|V cut dowVin. (2)
As rm lre,,,T been stated, the litb lty of any-
one, other than the party actually gtatlty of the wrong-
ful act, procesis uoon the theor'; qui facit per allu,
1 ) 4 Inst.. 114.
(2) Ctrvin v :7%oyer of iK.y. 14 abb. Pr. 00- .
fadct per se. 'ihe uarty enriploy!ng h-f the rwlertion of
t -Le party emnployed, and It Is re:ieonable that he who has
miaje the co-olce of an Lmskllful, careleml poroon,
ro,1ld be made to ansver for a ,y injury reculting from
the ,,wit of' skI 1, or writ of care of the person employ-
ed. J-ut the party sought to be charged must nt )nd in
the character of employer to the party by v<hose negll-
gent and carelcos conduct the injury haq been occasion-
ed; otherwise the true principle underlying the rule,
nor the rule itself caa1:t apply.
L I A 1- I L I T Y' 0 F vi A a' T i F C H
A U T S 0H ikViAN 1T D 0 N E U N D E R
iI S M (M A J4 1).
The leadlng, c e on the liability of , mas ter for
acts of te ,,ervant doris under his cornarid is that of
Gregory v Piper (1) decided in the court of Queens
Bench 1i 1829. The action vws treasures for plsclng
largeo quanti tls of' rubbish a, alnst the walls and gate,
of the plaintiff. It appeared that the plaintiff occu-
pied a public house called the "Rising Sun" with a sta-
ble yard belonging to it wihere he put up the horses of
his guests. Thbe way to the .stable was3 through a yardl
in the rear called the "Old Hings Yard," Subsequently
the defendrnt pur-iased the Old i1n s Yard and disputed
the plaintiff's rigt to pass along the same to hie sta-
ble. :e erployed one S. to lay down rubbish in order
to obstruct the way. S. , when called as a witness,
testified that he had been instructed by the defendant
not to let any of tie rubblsh to touch the woll of the
platntiff; that he had executed those orders a, nearly
(1) Gre,gory v Piper, i ( E . .L. 454.
as he oul, and that the rubbish, being of' -, loo e kilnd
as it becmsr- dry naturally tumbled awisnt the plaintlff'ls
all. The question before the sourt vja ihether tke
trespanss vas the act of the master, or of hi, servint.
edThe evidence shoviAthat the naturcl consequenco of tie
act ordered to be done utin, that the rubb i h nLhoul't go
at:sins, the vvall, anl c o the maoter v ,.n held anov, er-bile
in tre.-iesc. Littleda le j. a fter irecenting a hypo-
thetical cse, concludes by saying; if the servant
therefore in carrying into execution the orders of the
master, uses ordinary care, and injury is done to an-
other, the master is liable:" Park J. wa, of the same
opinion and thougrlht the defendant liable. HIe says:"if
a single otone had been placed against the vall it would
have been sufficient. 'le defendant must be taken to
have contemplated all the probable consequences of the
act v fnic6_ he had or'Iered to be Tone; and one of those
probable consequences wa that the rubbismh would touch
the plaintiff's vall. If' that ,qs so, the flying of
Ite rubbish s[)1lnst the v, ll was as rn .,. the defendant'S7
act, as if' it had been done by his express comrmand. "
T.-he leferadtinlt , , theroforo, the peroon w~ho caucor3
the act to be lone, and for the neccoary or natural
conequeicer; of his own at, he vias held liable.
Several qucetioono u>ent the-neb'en upon a 8tudy
of thio cace xi lch well deserve a car eful ocnoier,tion.
As to whether thc ervant ,ua; the defendant's ser<rart
tlere wtis no doubt in this particI,'r case; nor va ,- it
diopted that tie 8u'rvant acted beyond the coope of his
authority. !But the question very frecqu-ently trieo
in caoen of this .-nort,-- who atre inclir lec w1thin the
term, "servwirt?" Te very n- ture of thic, 8ubject will
Shou, the ir~portnace of' olvlns such oo (uen e.ton tit the
outset; or rtther of layin < down some tent by which the
relation of manter and 8ervnt may be acertrined.
Having deter,,-Ined who are ncervants it becomec neceocary
to underotrxd what is meant by the terri , wbi c. occur
so frequently in the caeen and text booko, "scope of
authority" and, "course of emnT)lo yMeLnt, and first, .............
-ho are oervantso within the meanin!.' of tie rule?-----
The maxim, whicha is used to exzreec[f the doctrine
un-ler nonsilderatlon, implies that the peron to be nhar ,-
ed must stand in the reluti on of superior- to the pers:on
w-i o comi ts the ronVful a ct. rTerefore, in order that
trio maxim my W)T)ly to tiny parti cu].ar case there must be
a ouocrior t-nd a cubordln~tc whose wrongful act is the
ground of' complaint. (1) In the ordinary acceptation
of' the term:i "8(rvtint '" an element of menbil or buoe ser-
vice seems to be conveyed; but the terr:i ic not restrict-
ed to ron ed in ) menial or even domestic ser-
vice. Tihe term servant covers .I broe ,,d field and ! _
applicable to any relatlon in which, vit h referecriee to
any mattter out of iihich an illeged wrong has oprung, tbe
person ;oht to be charged ht',s the rifght to control the
action of' person-, dolngi the Clleg(e- vronq. Thl s ri ht
of, o0ntrao appears to be the most reliable test by whica
to determine vhether t.e relatonmaster and servant ex-
ists. O viuo said by Benrietl J. in ,i recent Vermont
cioe, (2) "the responsibility of the -.aster grows out
of, and is measured by his control over his servants;
and in fact it begins aind ends withl- it; although there
are cases where the rule has been satisfied wit1 a slight
degree of' actual control over the servant; without the
(1) .Blackwell v Viewell, 24 Earb. -356.
(2) Towm of Pav;let v 1.R.Co. 28 Vt. 29)!.
existance of this essential element of centrol and di-
roction over the servant, it is difficult to discover
any principle whIch can,in la.,make the acts of the ser-
vant the acts of the mastera " This right of' control-
ling the conduct of another implies the power to di8-
charge him from the service or employment for just cause;
accordingly the £owaer to disoharge is oald to be a guide
by which to determine whethler the relation exlits. "The
true test to detormine who is the master, and conse-
quently who 1 liable to the party Injured, 1 to deter-
mine who employed the servant aad who had the po,,er to
discharge him. " (1) The difficulty In all these cases
is not foiund In the rule of Pespondeat Superior itself,
for that Is simple aad easily understood, but the
trouble lles in I~sert~ Wiif who;0 seivait the person is
that does the injury. V.-en the last ips dedoled the
question I" ,olved.
Thep rule is, to- a ')v-C:11,j'r,-,(,,foundc-d on ti certa1n
power which the servant is privileged to exercise, and
which, for the prevention of injuries to third parties,
he is bound to exerci.e over the acts of hls subordln-
--------------------------------------------------
(1) 1.ichael v Stanton, 3Hn (2
aates; therefore, where no ouch pover exio ts, the rule,
cannot be exercised. Hence thi direct ani absolute
co-exiotence of the maxim with the relutioa to xhicll It
Is applicable, ,inrl to the particular subject ,)tter to
whieh thaft relation exten15;, is an Import.,nt propoolt-
ion in "letermining to what cases the rule may be exten-
ded.
There is one important qualtflcLjtlon to be obser-
ved in this connection, namely; that there can be but
one responsible superior for the qame subordinate at
the same time, and in respect to the same transaction.
The old cases regarded absolute ownership in the
property, in the use of whic)! some injury had occured,
',s a conclusive test in dertermlnig who was liable for
the servant's acts in the use of the same; but this is
not regarded as law now. Ov,_ershlp may, however, be
material as evidence In showing whose servant its cus-
todlan was. As for exa-Ple permitting one's name to
remain over the door of a house of business and on a
cart, i. evl'ence that such person holds hioself out ns
owner of the cart and muster of the driver, so as to
16
charge him for liability for the driver's negligence. ( 1)
To conclude,thLerefore, a general rule may be laid
doywn as follows: The ,ervant must, at the time of the
accident, have been in the charge of the master's prop-
erty by A1Us consent and authority, engaged in his bul-
ness, 8nd In respect to that property and business, un-
der the master's control.
The French law on this point Is in harmony with
our own. But in their Interpretation of the article
the French lawyers have qualified the doctrine so far
as regards the "Cormrettant" and "prepos&" by aying
that to make the former liable for the negliigence of
the latter, the prepose must be acting,"sous les ordres,
sous la direction et la surveillance du cormettant;"
that is, the servant must be acting not only under the
orders, but runder the direction and surveillance of the
principle.
Liability of the master when the Servant actr be-
yond the scope of his authority.--- The general rule
is that a master will not In any cage be liable for
wrongs committed by his servant when not acting about
---------------------------------------------------
(1) Sloane v Elmer, 1 Hun 310.
his master's business ; or whlat is Pub, tantlally the )arsm
thing, while rot acting wi1thin the scope of' his author-
ity. This statement is uo reasonable and is based on
grounds so obvious that they need scarcely be sug!e, ted.
In all affair8 of life men are obliged to accomplish
some acts through othaers. But vwhore could such iDor,,)oro
be found who would venture so to act, if the mere cir-
cumstance that they were employed b; another about any
business, made them insurer. aquinst all wrongo whi ci
they might cornmit durin- the period of the employment.
Our law does not even put a father to such an onerous
responsibility in respect of the torts of his Pinor
child. Plthough for reasons of public policy the hus-
band was formerly held liable "civiliter" for the torts
of his wife. But in all other cases where the rela-
tion of master and servant oubslsto by virtue of con-
tract, and the servant acts outside of his employment,
the maxim Respondeat Superior does not apply.
ih.,t is meant by the terms, "course of employment"
and"scope of authority?"--- These expressions are
found in nearly all the text books relating to th-s ub.-
joct, and are current in the arguments and decisions of
this olts8 of cases. They are ohr , ho11 w h have 
settled slgnifice-ttlo, but their rn,,iLing cn orl, be
accura tely defined by th( 1 llustrat. .or of' autthor! ti-
ti':ely dee led ca!es. There are two cases 171i 011 may
serve to lllustrn-tione; in the one thAe defendant was
held lia-ble, 1 the other not. The lictinction, If
any, betweel., the circumstances of' the two cases 1 very,
fine, but they are the leadn;' cases and thus give the
key to the whole line of authoreties on the subject.
In the first case, 'Uhatman v Pearson, (1) a contractcr,-
defendant Pearson - was employed under the district
board of Greenwich in carting away the soil excavated
from a highway during the construction of a sewer, and
for this purpose employed a number of men with horses
and carts. The duty of the -ien so employed was to
travel with their carts for a certain number of hours
each lay over a specified route, with an hours interval
for linner, but never to leave their hores or carts,
or quit their work. One of the men went home to din-
ner at a place about a quarter of a mile out of the line
of' hi work, and left his horse and cart in the street
(1) ia trnaun v Pearson, L. R. 3 G.P. 422.
In front of llnluo liPth r i ivtni i:
,"t, the horse ran- away aid injured the pla,.itiff's
raillngo ; for vhic h damage, act:jo I.- brought. The
jude at t-Ce trial left it to the jury tc eY whether
the "irtver h't .bee, ' i 1ty of nelO l i e.,ne, t 'il whth~r
el e ' 11! !(! ti1 to i1 Tin the scope of his author-
ity. They fo-und that he was, and gave their verdict
for the plaintiff on both points. This decision was
sustained by the higher court.
The second case, Story v Ashton (1) vme this;
The defendant was a wine merchant, and oni t'l. lay in
question sent his clerk and carnmn with a horse and cart
to deliver wine at 13. They delivered the vine and re-
ceive1 some empty bottles to return. It was the duty
of' the carman to have driven back directly to the defen-
dant's office, left the bottles there, and taken the
horse and cart around to the stables which.were near.
Instead of doing this the carman, when wi.thin a short
distance from honae, at the persuasion of the clerk,
turned off I,,i another direction on an errand for the
clerk. 'vCiile driving along the road in pursuit of this
errand, he heedlessly drove over the plaintiff. Tiqe
(1) Story v Ashton, L. R. 4 J.3. 4Tz6.
que tlon before the court wac, ivhether the defendLant
x , vu lble for the negligence of the carmni; and this
waB decided in the negatlve. Cockburn J. 8ays; "The
true test lo, that the master Io only r-enponsible no
long ac the servant can be said to be doini tfie act, tmle
dolng of' vhlc he Is guilty of nelgence in tro course
of hi eMnlo ent as servant ......... Here the carman
started on an entirely nev and independent journey,
vhich had nothing at all to ao vzlath h1.9 employment. ,
Theo firv-t. c...,. ic, Lu extreme one for the
Inference of the master'8 liabilitY.
LI~ t j A I-TLT Ui TUA M 71I-
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iihc more recent, an I 1 t I n ecieral y cof10YICY,
the bette r rule, I, that, ilthough the act ilr, f, i klll
perfo rred, the rihster v,.11 not be relev, d fror: lab1I-
1ty, p;rovided the act -,-s lone in the courn;e of the
muster'e busInes8s and ;ithin the scope and Irnj-its of,
the 8ervant's employment. Upon tire authori , cf the
eorlIest case on trIs point, MCelAanus v Cr1cket, .()
holdlng that a master Is riot lifble for the V1ilftul acts
of a servant In drivnfK his mtister 'f earr age a, bafnst
ancther, v,thout the direetion or assent of the moster,
a long line of declIoni erose. Tihe rule declored in
these ca 
_t- thatthe master V,, llablr, only, w;here
the injurIv was caused ivTholly by the rservantfs negligence
in the diocharge of the rrsster'e business, and not
vhere the servant's acts iere Intentionjlly vrosigful ant
malicious. The theory on uIicloh the decisions are put
seems to be, that authority from the nester to the oer-
( 1 ) Mc ,anus v Cricket, 1 East., 106.
vant to cormmit a ,rong or it crime vi1 not be implied,
and that ouch vilft:l acts i lll be deemed those of' the
servant and not the m-ater. They recogni::e a peculiar
ment, l condi tion of' the iervont wt the time the act v.,; o
done, and make the noril quality of the act the test of
the 1 astor's liability, Instead of leaving it to depend
upon the inquiry -.hether or aot the act ias -lone in the
cource of' the master's buleness. Under the operation
of4 nuch a rule the master would get the benefit of all
his servants acts done for him, vihether right or vwrong ;
and would escape the burden of all Intentional acts
done for hirm i,.i ch were wron.rF'. In other ,ords, It
would enable the master to escape liability fo certajin
acts, because done by another, for xhic(h he would be
responsible if done by hicelf'; and the Dublic, obllrged
to deal vitb h i a!ents, might be vholly vilthout redress
for any intentional injuries done by the servants. 0-
cording to this it would always be safer for a man to
conduct his buoineso vicariously than in hi ovn perso .
A dortrine so fruitftul of mischlef conld not long
stand unshaken In an enlightened system of jurlsprudence
and Ao lie finc- it reDud1~ted by eminent xvrlters. (1)
"The languinn-ue In v Cricket", an rald by Judg,,e
Redfiel-1, (2) "i- either mlsunderstcod, or !I not 1o)V
in h1nerioa, and never hos been, " EBit this dictum must
be taken vith some quallficatior, for the case wa fol-
lowed for oome conslderable time in mTny of the states
of tiin country; as the development of the Ne. zork
lay on this point (see belov,,) Iiilndicate.
The question in, therefore, in all cases in vwhich
the master is sought to be charge] for the act of th>e
servant, not whether the act xms v:ilful or malicious,
but whether it v Iun ,one while the servant vsU3 en,(;ed
in the course of thne msioter'o busInern and ,ithin the
scope of' his employment. This rule is received with
approval as being the more just and reaisonable inter-
pretatlon of the liability of the servant,, and one .hicn
placeo it upon a clear and equitable founralitlon.
History of the New York doctrine ,s to vilf'ul
acts: --- The progress of the lay: on this point is not
more interesting In the state of' He,- , York ihan in many
other states of' the ui!on. Still as illustrative of
-------------------------------------------------------
(1) Cooley on Torts 535; FReeves DosP. Pel. C40.
(2) Hovive v Ne-urarch, 11 Ilien 49.
hov unuilllng the courts arc- to depart from tiny appar-
ently entLblispeKr precedent, thin ,itate furnishes a gocd
example. imd tIthough It may be necessary to reiter-
ate to nome extent vhat has ai1ready been nzid, still. a-i
brief resiite of the law must necessarily be inrdlgfed
in, if tLiny attempt is made to treat of' the development
of' this subject in Lew York state.
Tlhe doctrine that the master 1 8 riot liable for
the servat'e wlful act was followed in hew York at an
early date. The firnt cane wan wright v '-lilcox (1)
in whMich it was said thtt the master couldc not be held
liable for the servant"( wilful act of mischief. The
decision was based upon the theory that the vilftil act
of the servant was deemed to be u departure from the
masters buolness. The effect of thin rule -- as ,l-
ready stated pg.A.% -- was to make the wilfulnens of the
act, in every case, the test of liability. For If the
servant was engaged in his master's business and coqmmit-
ted a -viliful act, his employment,fo far an thaft act v:5o
concerned, terminated eo instaniti. .If' then the act w ,as
vwilful or riallclous, the pl ,intiff who suffered from. It,
vI ; r 1 -I lt v V i 1c ox , 19 Viend. 3 4,r3.
CoUld not uc U matter cf 1aw recover.
-evert 1 caces follow thl,j, one of whIch3 erpecltl-
ly dogerv( s brief mention. hic I the case of' Ieaecc,
v Thlrd Ave. E.R.Uo., (1) one wni r P've rlce to Thljcr
(iifficul 1ty upon the questlion tic to vht t e ctr,, of' th: rer -
vant the mteter IF- Iiebl(; for. Here a lady passenger
upon a horse car deciring t',1 alight, stepped out upon
the plotform of the car and reQuested the conductor to
stop it; declining to get off -until the car had come to
a full stop. Vhi le the car vwen still In motion, the
conductor threw the lady frorT the ,came with grett vio-
lence, go that, falling upon the ptrhment, she wnc ser-
louely injured. The court of apeale helr3 the act was
wanton and malicious, and not in performance of tin.,
dutyv of th mnater; and therefore the ma,ter was not
liable. The case hua been oeverely, criticloed, and
eminent authority hau declared it erroneously decided. ()
It is,vithout a doubt, a border case. ; and althougZh the
true tott for the liability of' mactero is there recog-
nized, still tth,: difference in opinion arose from the
peculjler facts, and the case cannot be considered as
(1) Isaacs v Third ye. L.G.40. 4- i%,. i. 122.
(v) Moai±e Underhill on T'ort c I.
seeking to overrule or qulify the doctrine in any mnn-
ner. The T.P.Co. contrieted with the pasfleng!er for L
,.'ufe apr1 courte!ous exit from the car, in the conductor,
bein it chii of the car, v.ua chrgel v;ith the duty
of provid[ing it. SO that ,:]hen he violited that duty
he wva guilty of a breach of' the tuty for ,,,ih he v:&c
recponeib le.
The true rule as finally laid dow n in !'ott v
Consumers Ice Co. -(1) seeons to be that for the acts of
a gervtrit within the general scope of' his employrnent,
while en,,uii:ed in his master's busines, the l-Utter l,
reeponolrile whether the act be l!one negligently, wanton-
ly or even vilfully; the quality of the act does n-rt
eLcuspe. Thus wa the rule of LqcPTPanus v Cricket, as
laid down in Vrifght v 71ilcox, gradually relaxed and at
ltiet completely overthrown in the state In ihlch it re-
ceived the most emphatic recognition.
Exceptions as to tbe applic:titon of the rule re-
garding the cervant's v.ilful or rnallclous acts :---There
are certain c!ssee of coesf in ,hl ch the applics tioI
of the tet -- see ptAieJ(-- us to vllful acts, is not
(1) -,iott v Consumeers Go. 1.3 I Y. 54 3.
of' eoentinl import,.nice, but in v~hl. h the master is:
nevertheles8 held rcnponsible f'cr injurilem causecd by
the v,rongftil acts of' ,i servants. These are oases
xdiere he Is under tin nbaoltt, imperative duty to do
o certaIn act. Suchi ore the f'ol]f,wln': (ti) 'h hoere the
man ter has made a contract to do t ocerto ln thing, and
his servants, by vrongful acts, have prevented ito ful-
filment, though ouch acts be wilful and mlicious. (1)
(b) V'here the master is at common carrier of' passengers,
and th erefore, urder the legal obligation to T)rotect
its patrons while in his charge and :ive thema ,is.fe
and comfortable journey. It is the carrier's duty to
treat his passengers respectfully, and protect thom
aiiainct the violence and insults, not only of sttrangFers
and co-passengers, but particularly of' hi own servtintr.
If' therefore the paso enger if assaulted and insulted
through_ the vvi iful mlsoonduct of an ernplcyee, the mas-
ter is held liable. In one aspect, this duty m,.v be
regarded as flowing from an irailierj contract; so that
the maeter w*ould be liable on the same ground , in
case (a) above. (2)
(1I ) v;-eed v Panama j .Fm.Co. 1 ,.Y. E4C.
1Blackp tone v Y* z. & Eri e I. 1.Co. 20 ,. . .
(2 ) hr,%aIt v !hi ch, 106 lasq. 180.
Co dard v a ra Erl 6rLlk 1.l E.Go. KT ive. 202.
(c) vhere the Pervt.-nt, by hic virongful ti ct, croutc, i
nuisance npon the nmaster'c premlcrnc, or doe.f. an act In
the use or liqprovement of ouch premi ec, which cuuoo,,?
a trepTcs, to adjacent property; as, hiere servants are
blaoting on their mau'ctr'8 land, rn ntone and earth
are thrown upon the aidjacent prerli sac. (1)
(d) ',Ihere the r.cster Is an Ii±nkecler, and therefore ab-
solutely responsible tt corrion lov for the aafotxr of
the goods entrunted to IMm, (except from injuries oc-
casioned by the act of Ciod or the public enemy) and his
servants cause the loss or destruction of' the goods,
or Injur. to then. The master is liable for the los
sustained, although the servants did the wrongftil act
! 11fully.
-------------------------------------------------
( 1) ilay v (3ohoes Go. . 2 1 F.Y U~.
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lhl appl cti t! on of tbe doctrine -esioondeut ;uper-
ior frequently gives rise to questions of great nicety
respecting the reosponuibilty for acts or negligence
of ,, contractor.
Lefore conci'iering the various cases, a geneicl
rule a3 L) result of them may be laid doiri a -follows:
One who has contrac ted 1,i th a competent and fit percori,
exercislng an independent employment, to de ai piece of
work not in itself unlavful or attended with danger to
others, t.ccordlng to the contrctor's own methods, and
-itnout ,is being subject to control except an to the
results of his v.ork, Will not be answerable for the
wrongs of suc> contractor, his sub-contrtictors, or his
servants co, qitted in the prosecutIon of such work.
,he o&rting, point from v'!h1.h till the modern cS,;C
on this qurstlon have been argued, is the case of Bush
v csteirman. (1) hriefly stated the case i, this: A
owning a house by the rcadside, contracte t]  to
------- ------------------------------------------
( 1) Lus! 1 Y'1 Lteinma"'n 1 L'os. & Full I. ZIci' .
repair It for a stipulated ntun; LJ contracted with 0 to
do the work; C with D to furnlsh materlis. 'he oer-
vnt of 1D brouLght a large quantity of lime to the house
and plced it In the rcad by ,hich the plaintiff'8 car-
ri-Ie ws overturned. 'It was held that 1 war answer-
able for the d~ra!es sustained. Eyre C.J. says, ho:-
ever, that he has, "great difficulty In statln, accur-
ately the ground on vhich the action Is to be supportec1'
1Looke J. decidec the case on the ground that "one hav-
ing work going on for hia benefit, and on hi own prern-
!8eo, must be civilly ansverable for the acto of those
whor he eraploys." 1ccord! ng? to thle a '-,an who bulldsq
a house Is responsible for the negligence of every man,
and his serwnts, who furnishes materltl for the ovie,
whereby damages result to third parties;- and this,
re urdlcss of ho remote or inconsequent1il the da~mtrgC.
An examina tlon of the authorities on w hich hush
v .teinraan is decided, will justify the conclusion that
the case does not even recognize the principles on whih
the former cases are decided; for in them, the acts done
w.,hich were the subject of the complaint, were either un-
der the control of' tie defendant , or ,loe raounted to
a nuisance committed upon the preminee to tl'.e injury
of' the plaintiff'"s esttate.
'The question, which seemed to be unr;ettled, came
up a. 1n in Qutirman v 1'irnett, (1) a case La; to the
liability of' the ovner of' a cerriae, who had hired
hores and (, driver from a livery otable, for negligence
of the driver w/ hich a third peroon wais injured. The
court held th-ot the defendant wao not liable on the
ground that he did not do the act whi (h sousod the in-
jury, or in any uay controlled or directed it. hi8
case hois been -uniformly followed in En ',and, and is re-
garded ac having -:ettled the question tmere.
The decisions in the United stateo have not been
entirely uniform. The leadln; ease,- Hilliard v hich-
ardeon,- (2) follows the holding of Quarman u Lurnett
Thomas J., in ain elt.borate opinion revie(vIng all prior
casen, nays of' Bush - ,Steinman-. if a cane can be
said to huve been overruled, indirectly and directly,
by reasoning,- and authority, this has been. ho one
could have extiti ned the cane without feeling the dl f-
( r1 ) ( iro -n v 1 urnett 6 4. & V1. 499.
2 ) IAll1iar,1 v _L_. (- irdpoil, 3 Gray. '349.
flcult of thaot cletr hoded judKC'e, Clof Just!oe Eyre,
of knowing on whatr1 te declion wafS put," In
bLew York there h been a multltwic of' cms and for
time they nooTee'le inclined to folo1e, the lend of Jlm'.n v
Ste!nmarI. Kit In Lliake v Ferrls (1) It vwvin declored
tqat the prInciple laid dowri l ush v viteinman was
not law In ,iev; York stote.
'iho ,Ire independent corit-rctors?--- It Is im-
portant to di otlnguish. betweon , servant and a contract-
or. T-he term_. "contrictor" is usel to designate a per-
son who Is not, like a servant, unier the constant and
iminediate lirection and control of his employer in the
prooecution of the work which he Is engaged to do, but
who accomplishe, a partlcular end or result, controllin7
the work durin; i to progrcss. An independent contract-
or ao defined by a Pa. judge (2) is. "one who renders
service in the course of an occupation, representinlg the
will of' his employer only as to the result of' hip vork,
and not an to t-,_e means by which It Io accernpli she1l "
,The contractor munt answer not only fnrr >is ownm wrongs
but for the wrong co:inml ttel In the course of the work
(1) Blake v Ferris, 5 .Y. 46.
(2) iarrison v Collins, 8( P8. St. 159.
by his ,3ervant-.
Unde r the oper ti on of ouch, a rule the public wil
be better protected; f'or the contr.,tor, being renpon-
Polble for hin own ne gli enne, will thu" be tuFqht cau-
t I ; W1l le a ouffur Vrom the ne ;l,-1 g ce of' 'i8 si ervunirt,
will not be cOMpe led to re, ort f'or con penmition to the
in,orlvent er-urntc.
Unere work contracterl for is wrongful per 80,-.....
If a proprietor of' re'-l property contracto for work
which i8 wroingfuil oer ce,-- thtit is, if In ordinarily
performaing the stie its arno-uits to a nuiIvtnce, or in
directly or necensarily injurious3 to thir't imrte,-
he will be respon sible to quch third partie; for dam-
agec reoulti-Ig from the work, or nui, ance. Otherwiine
a responible pro prietor havin: work to perform, tie e-
ecution of whl, would be attendel with tangfer and per-
laps injury, to t1 ird parties, could lot the doing of
te vor: by contract to an irresponsible iDarty with the
view and frr the imrpose of avoidla,_ pesionUl liability
for any lamagen rosultri 7 fro,- ito execution iai the
iarner requiredl. The liability of te master in such
cases, houeveri, re;its upol te lie' tnat 3ie is N o-tree-
Pss0r, by retson ofle his diroctinfi or itrticIputln') ILI
the wol: done, and riot on the prinniple of Heoporre: t
Superi or.
u ier,,e, the ,ork 1s ',nl!eroun to ot, er . .
I'faccordin- to previous knovwle,, -o and efpert ice ,the
vwork whic: a prolrI etor enaaes a contruntc, r to do
ic likely to be d.)nxgeroue to otherf*q, thouqh corefull-
performed, it rests v, ith the proprietor to foresee suci
mischief arid. guard a ;minpt it. In other words the
proprietor directs an act to be done from which injur-
ious consequences will result, unlese some meano are
t ,ken tr prevent them in the sheape of' qdditiornl work,
but orit.s to direct the latter to be don( as a part
of' the contractor's duties. The proprietor is not,
therefore, in tne position of a man who has simply
authorized and contracted for the execution of' a work
froi n~hich, if, executed with due cutre, no injury can
arise; but Is responsible, if' in the pro7ress of the
work, injury arises from the negligence of the con-
tractor and his servants.
Liability f'or"collaterall" acts of' contractor..--.
"ll-tera. Itct an hiere referred to, in one not
directly connected xil th the work engaged in; an, levln
work ungutirTh'l nt nij-it, or a pile of dirt in t- high-
.- T'ie ruie is Ne l ,~tated b,%/ the -,aproIe court of'
the Un ta'l St( tes in 14obbine, CM,,go 1).Cllfford J.
sa o:, "when the obotrUntion or defect created or cused
in the treet is DuL dy to the work contract-
ed to be 'tone, ... . the rule In tha)t the proprietor
I a not liable"
There tT,, a line of caees d n i tnguIlnhed be-
tieen a contractor and a servant IL that a1 employer
wan not liable for a , "collateral" at of negligFence by
a contractor, whereas he wan li-,le for sucb acto on
the part of a servant. ][-it it is questionable whether
suci is the law now.
-)tatutory reg'ulations make proprietor liaole.---
,.here a duty is i posed by ,tatute upon a peroon to per-
forri an act, he cannot invoke the rule of Res-pondent
Superior to excuse any default or non-performance. Th In
is no plain that nothing more need be said regr!!ng it;
(1) Foobbins v Ch i (: *o, 4 Vkl. (U. '. ) 65 .
altioui tihers are maIny case decided on junt thin
g roul d.
Effect of negllgence in nelecting contractor.
"'ae relation of' moster and ,-;ervant depencd in a meanure
upon thin rlght whi r) the party employlng. hu of o-
leting the party employed. no one can be held re-ogio-
sible as principle, viho has riot the right to choose the
t:ent fro-m whose acts the injury flows. So if the
proprietor choose a contractor wholly incomp,1,etent for
the work eng),,aged in, and injury ensues, the proprietor
lo liable for his own negligence in making ouch a ciole.
Proprietor is liable when he personally interfere
with the contractor's worliuan.--- in employer may make
himself lia,.le by assumning control of the v,.ork or any
part of it, so that the relation of master and servant
is creat 1-, or go that an injury v,hi c' ens ue, may be
traced to thi so inter ferece. The rule laid dow n by
Bosworth J. in Hefferman v Penkard, (1) is that "if
an oviner modifies in any reupect his contract with
thone contracting to erect n bulldlri, so tht in Ioing
any particular act the i;orkrMen are obeying the direc-
(I) aefferman v Lenkurd,, 1 obt. (iN.Y.) z--F,
tioap, of thc oater, if that j-t I,- ioi))erouo rd ndg-
ligent, :ru,1 , ge eiisues, the ov;ner is liable,"
\Jmut supervision by the poroprietor vil1 take the
case out of the rule dependn necesarily upon the cir-
clm,qtnces3 of each coos, and the interpretatlon of the
contract itself. i1ho mere fact that the proprietor
retains a g7enerl supervis-,ion over the vr rk for the pur-
pose of otatipfyln. hinwelf that thle contrctt(,r c' rrles
out the .tipulatio- of the contract, is not control
sufficient to maIe h)_im responsible for the vroags done
to third pers ono in the prosecutloi af' the i:ork.
.If control Is stipuloted for -t all, it must not
be so absolute as to make the discretion of' the contract-
or subordinate to tjivt of his principle, and thus create
the relation of' mTater and serwnt.
P PL I G T.I i F T i1 E DO T R I II ;
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The doctrine of iespondett Superior applies tc
corpo: ation, as x.,ell c to Individualsn. It ntay be
bred'idly otated] thait in respect to the liability for the
acts of their servants, corporati ora otrirnd on the same
footing as nlndi'Aduals -wi th thin limitation; thtt the
busineis about which the -ervant iguctlng, wv7hen the
wrong was comnitted, must have been such L business as
the corporation could lawfull.: enul's in ; t 9at is, it
must have been Intr'a: YZrQQ ; and not ultra vires ; for
tle corporation catinot exercise other powers than thos e
whi ch are con ferred by lpginntive a'tbority.
Formerly the rule did nrt apply to muni!cipal cor-
porations so as to char!7e them for the delicts of their
servants; but now they tire held to the same liabIlity
in respect to the delicts of their officers and ser-
vants, when toting, about thelr official eripl(r,,jnent,
vi i ttaches to priv<Tte corporu tions and indlvidual _.
This liability is necessary vicarious, and resting upon
the maxim heo-1ondett ,)uerlor. Some otuten (ilew.York)
,1) have m (oIfe' tbe rule th t aCte nur t be Intra VI lr
to the extent, that a corportitlon In llible for the aet.
of Ito offic ero, done ;itila the ocone of their Lenerl
~rQ , though the utcl.r 0 vi.eh the offleer ',;-
sume:[ to do, ls one whici the corporation co:ld not
rlghtfully Jo.
(1) Booth v Farmers lnk., 50 i'. Y . 396.
1F..Co. r McCar thy, 96 : U.S 298.
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Agcnt; of' public officers.- Hiere there !o a dirs-
tinction betV, e officers who act directly for the pub-
lic and those who act distributively for the Individ-
ualo and Indirectly f'or the public. T/ose 1ho act In-
directly f( r the public are responnIble to the 1ndlvid-
uals for whom they undertake to act, in a private action.
but officers whose duties, are of a public nature are
not usually held liable for the wrongs of those through
whose agency they are obliged to act: they may, however,
be liable to the public in a criminal prosecution. They
are agents of the public and not of thoue superior of-
ficers whos;e orders they receive and obey. For exam-
ple, no instance is disclosed where an attempt has been
made to hold a milittary cormmander liable for the wrongs
of his subordinates, unle s such a i.rong could be direc-
tly traced to some negligence of' his own.
On the otner hand, officers, and sheriffs, who
act distributively for the public and receive their
fees from the uarticular individuals for whom they ,-ct,
are generally held liable for t!ie wrong, of their dep-
Uiti es.
Postimnstero, although nov,'erable for tle .unt of
attention to the officil conduct of t- elr subordinstes,
tire not responsiule for their ,ecrej, and individual de-
liriquences. Therefore an action does not lie wttinf t
a- pr otmater for the stealing of a letter by s -Torn ;-
sistaintsappointeI and retained by him In good fatith.
Put it is otherwise if t,,e postmaster employ a privte
per on, not duly a.-ointed and sworn as tn agssistant;
because this is official misconduct on the part of the
postmaster. So it has been held that a mall carrier
who has not been sworn bccording to law i not an of-
ficer of' the government, but a servant of the contract-
or who cappoints him, so that the latter is responsible
for n1is defaults.
Shipping. --- VJhether the master or the owner of
a shl: is liable for the neg ligence of a crew depends
upon the co Ltract between the rit ster and the ovner/ ex-
plined by ,urroumdlng circumsta-aces. The relation of
master and servant does not cease unless the owner has
glve Up all coltrnl nf' the vOsO-el and of her employ-
mont, arnr, ill the Irne11ate 'and direct interest in ton
frelf:ht earned --y her. In other words, if the c-irter
purty Io such that the ovner is to provide everythin
andc hAve a crew of his own choosi:;, or retu Lis powVer
to dismiss the officers and crew, or in f'act hire,,
pays and controls them, the own ,r, and nrt tlne rasiter,
is to be deemel. the mater of the crew. Dt It i ob-
vious that if a contract anouts to a: of the
vessel for a aeflnite terra, then the charterer becomes
the oY:rer pro hP. c vice, and the crew are his servants.
The tendency of' the courtsjis to hold the crew the cer-
vtmts of, the o ner instead of the charterer. (1)
License'! public carmen or draymen, and others who.
under a public license, follov certain voc:tlons on be.-
half of any one who may hire them to do a puarticular
job with_in the bonds of their license, do not stand in
the relation of' servants to the one hirlng them; but
are deemed independent contractors In respect of t'itit
particulur job. fhe -eru fact, however, that a r.ian is
obliged by I-in, to select servants from a particular
-------------------------------------------------
(1) pA11nett v Foster, 1 Daly 502.
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cla8 who are skllled In their respective callings, and
are so 1Iipensed, doen not necensarily exclude the re-
latio,, of' master and servant existing between them.
0 C)q 0 L U S I 0 14
Such i, t brief ontline relating to the respnl-
blIlty of' masters to third parties for the torts of
their servanto; but the distinctions vn to wvcr a ser-
vant is, and v.hon not acting within the scope of his
eiaploymnent. or even vhether he be a nervant at allrtare
so refined, and the authorities are no conflicting that
a tlhorough and careftil study Is necessary in order that
the difference may be distinguished.
The writer has attempted to first lay dovn gener-
al rules and then point out the more important excep-
tions and !int tattorn to thie same, wi could be gat-
-red froTn the cases. It ts im-ponnible to lay down
any ,et cf, "iron clad" and inflexible rules applicable
to all cases of this nature, for the reason that exact-
ly the s~m e ci rcus-itances are not likely to occur in any
two cases. However, certail rules, may be deduced from
the almost infini te mass of- ly.: on the subject, which
apply to classes of cases, the f,'-tcts of whlch are of the
atme gener'l character.
--------------------------------------------------
In conclusion, If' what huc already been sald -hall
materially aid or serve a, a gulide In folvlng any quo-
tion respecting a mu ter'o liability for hln, ,9e(w-o1t(
tor t , One purpoee of the writer will y)tve been ,ittine].
S . p, ....
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